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Abstract:
Fiscal policy is an important government tool for managing the economy, having the ability to affect the total 
amount of output produced - GDP. Changes in the level and composition of government spending, taxation or 
other instruments of fiscal policy have impact on aggregate demand, the pattern of resource allocation, and the 
distribution of income. The article shows the mechanisms through which fiscal policy stabilizes the business 
cycle, and the specific requirements for fiscal policy during recession; the practical problems that may occur in 
implementing an effective fiscal policy are emphasized. Regarding the circumstances of the current financial and 
economic crises, the revival of the fiscal policy as a macroeconomic policy faces high expectations as to what it 
can accomplish. The paper highlights the composition of fiscal stimulus package, and reviews the specific fiscal 
stimulus plans adopted so far by different countries and their objectives. The final section contains an overview 
of  the Romanian government  response  to the current  crises,  regarding  fiscal  policy.  The conclusion is  that 
Romania has conducted an inconsistent and ineffective fiscal policy, which has contributed to macro-economic 
and  fiscal  imbalances  and  to  an  increased  fiscal  pressure  on  business.  Therefore,  a  medium-term  fiscal 
framework has to be implemented, in order to ensure effectiveness and fiscal sustainability.  
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“The time to act is now”
José Manuel Durão Barroso, 2008
Introduction
Fiscal policy is defined as the deliberate manipulation of government income and 
expenditure,  so  that  to  achieve  economic  and  social  objectives,  and  sustain  growth 
[article  on  http://www.buythemap.com].  Fiscal  policy  is  based  on  the  theories  of  British 
economist John Maynard Keynes. Also known as Keynesian economics, this theory basically 
states that  governments  can influence macroeconomic productivity levels  by increasing or 
decreasing tax levels  and public  spending.  The two main instruments  of fiscal  policy are 
government spending and taxation. Changes in their level and composition may have impact 
on aggregate demand and the level of economic activity, the pattern of resource allocation, 
and  the  distribution  of  income  [article  on  http://en.wikipedia.org].  Higher  government 
spending or a decrease in taxes is an injection of income increasing aggregate demand, whilst 
a decrease in spending or a rising of taxes is an income leakage causing aggregate demand to 
fall. Based on the Keynesian theory, the level of spending in the economy will determine the 
levels of output, i.e. Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and employment, hence the government 
can control these areas of the economy, as it has the power to change aggregate demand, and 
lessen the fluctuations of the business cycle. 
Specific instruments of fiscal policy 
Fiscal policy is an important tool for managing the economy having the ability to affect 
the total amount of output produced, which is GDP. Its ability to affect output by affecting 
aggregate demand makes it a potential tool for economic stabilization. The basics of the fiscal 
mechanism  is  explained  by  Weil  (2008): if  the  economy  is  in  recession,  with  unused 
productive capacity and unemployed workers, then increases in demand will lead mostly to 
more  output  without  changing  the  price  level;  if  the  economy is  at  full  employment,  by 
contrast, a fiscal expansion will have more effect on prices and less impact on total output.
Governments have available various instruments to promote their main objectives, like 
as  allocation  of  resources,  stabilisation  of  the  economy,  redistribution  of  income,  and 
economic growth. It must be realised that, at times, while the instruments have changed, the 
main governmental objectives have remained the four listed above [Tanzi (2008)].
Government  spending is  the  most  traditional  instrument.  Both  the  level  of  public 
spending and its structure or composition are important and can be considered as separate 
instruments. Taxation is the other obvious instrument, which comprises at least four potential 
and  separable  instruments,  such  as  the  level  of  taxation,  the  structure  of  taxation,  tax 
expenditures and tax incentives. According to Tanzi, some countries rely more on levels and 
structures (Scandinavian countries) while others have relied more on tax expenditures (Anglo-
Saxon countries) and on tax incentives (Asian countries and many developing countries) (see 
Tanzi (2008) for an overview of fiscal policy instruments). 
Fiscal policy can work in two general ways to stabilize the business cycle, which are 
automatic stabilizers, and the discretionary fiscal policy. 
Automatic  Stabilizers consist  in  a  “built-in”  fiscal  mechanism that  acts  to  reduce 
automatically the expansions and contractions of the business cycle  [fiscal policy, article on 
http://www.amosweb.com]. This mechanism  expands automatically the fiscal policy during 
recessions  and contracts  it  during booms,  being one form of countercyclical  fiscal  policy 
[Weil (2008)]. It depends on the level of aggregate production and income, such that business 
cycle instability is automatically dampened without the need for discretionary policy action. 
Automatic  stabilizers  work  automatically,  being  no  need  for  enacting  legislation, 
passing  bills,  or  undertaking  any other  policy  action.  These  stabilizers  are  built  into  the 
structure of the economy and the government sets up the rules and criteria under which taxes 
and transfer payments work. If people meet the criteria, then they pay the taxes or receive the 
transfer payments. The amount of each depends on the number of people meeting the criteria, 
which  is  dependent  on  business  cycle  activity  [fiscal  policy,  article  on 
http://www.amosweb.com].  Automatic  stabilizers  increase  budget  deficits  during  times  of 
recessions or decrease them during booms. They enact countercyclical policy without the lags 
associated  with  legislative  policy  changes  [article  on  http://www.investopedia.com]. They 
include income taxes and transfer payments.
 Income taxes largely depend on the level of aggregate  production and income.  If 
production and income rise, tax collections also rise. Income taxes also tend to be progressive, 
i.e. the proportion of taxes paid increases with income. This means that tax revenue is higher 
in an economic boom and lower in a recession, not only in absolute terms, but also as a 
proportion of national income [automatic  stabilizers,  article  on http://www.amosweb.com]. 
Forms of tax that act like automatic stabilizers are: (i)  Taxes on corporate profits - go up 
substantially  during  boom  times,  and  decline  rapidly  during  times  of  recession;  (ii) 
Progressive  income  taxes -  push  people  into  higher  income  tax  brackets  during  booms, 
substantially increasing their tax bill and reducing government budget deficits (or increasing 
government surpluses). During recessions, many individuals fall into lower tax brackets or 
have no income tax liability. This increases  the size of the government  budget deficit  (or 
reduces the surplus). Other forms of tax do not exhibit these effects, because they are roughly 
proportionate  to  income  (e.g.  value  added  tax),  or  they  bear  no  relation  to  income  (e.g. 
property tax) [article on http://www.investopedia.com].
 Transfer  Payments,  including  social  security  to  the  elderly,  unemployment 
compensation to the unemployed, and welfare to the poor, depend on the level of aggregate 
production  and income.  They work  opposite  to  taxes:  if  aggregate  income rises,  transfer 
payments tend to fall, as people are less likely to retire, be unemployed, or fall into the ranks 
of the poor. 
Discretionary Fiscal Policy is a policy action consisting of changes in a fiscal program 
initiated by the government in order to change aggregate demand, providing an alternative 
way to stimulate the economy when aggregate demand and interest rates are low and when 
prices are falling or may soon be falling [Feldstein (2002)].  Discretionary fiscal  policy is 
made more difficult due to lags in recognizing the need for changed fiscal policy and the lags 
that occur with enacting the changed fiscal policy. There usually is a lag between the time that 
changes  of  fiscal  policy  are  needed  and  the  time  that  the  need  to  act  is  widely 
recognized. Additionally,  a  time  lag  may be  between  the  moment  of  recognition  and  the 
moment  that  fiscal  policy changes are actually enacted. Lastly,  the impact  of a change in 
fiscal policy may not be felt until six to twelve months after the change has occurred. For 
example,  an expansionary fiscal policy (see Box 1) may be enacted when the economy is 
already  recovering  from  a  recession  [article  on  http://www.investopedia.com]. These  are 
accompanied by the lack of accurate forecasts.
Box 1. Expansionary fiscal policy
An  expansionary fiscal  policy (government  spending higher  than tax revenue)  is  a 
stance of fiscal policy that involves a net increase in government spending, through a rise in 
government  spending  or  a  fall  in  taxation  revenue  or  a  combination  of  the  two,  being 
associated with a budget  deficit  [article  on http://en.wikipedia.org].  This leads  to  a larger 
budget deficit or a smaller budget surplus than the government previously had, or a deficit if 
the government previously had a balanced budget. According to Weil (2008), in a recession, 
the government can run an expansionary fiscal policy,  thus helping to restore output to its 
normal level and to put unemployed workers back to work. Often, the focus is not on the level 
of the deficit, but on the change in the deficit. A contractionary fiscal policy (government 
spending higher lower than tax revenue) occurs when net government spending is reduced 
through either higher taxation revenue or reduced government spending or a combination of 
the two, being associated with a surplus [article on http://en.wikipedia.org]. 
In  practice,  discretionary  fiscal  measures  are  typically  slower  to  arrive  than  both 
automatic stabilizers and monetary policy responses. Moreover, fiscal measures often become 
permanent, implying that public debt moves upward. According to Scott (2008), one of the first 
questions  that  policymakers  need  to  address  is  “whether  discretionary  fiscal  policy can be 
delivered on time and delivered well”. 
He concludes that, in the past, it has usually 
proven  a  challenge  to  meet  these  criteria: 
discretionary  fiscal  policy has  usually  been 
used  less  frequently  than  monetary  policy 
during downturns, and it has taken longer to 
arrive,  often  after  it  is  needed.  Scott  also 
notes that the response of discretionary fiscal 
policy is typically weaker than the stimulus 
provided by automatic stabilizers (Figure 1). 
Figure  1.  Responses  to  business  cycle 
changes 
Source:  Scott.  2008.   “Policy  Responses  to 
Slowdowns: Making Fiscal Stimulus Effective 
during Downturns”, IMF Survey Magazine. 
Considering the differences between advanced and emerging economies, an IMF survey 
(2008)  finds  that  in  advanced  economies,  discretionary  fiscal  policy  has  typically  been 
countercyclical,  that  is  taxes  have been cut  and spending increased  during downturns.  In 
emerging economies, discretionary fiscal policy has been procyclical that is stimulus has been 
added during good times and removed during downturns.  This suggests  that  governments 
could  try  to  enhance  the  scope  and  effectiveness  of  automatic  stabilizers.  In  a  report 
concerning  economic  crises  in  Europe  (2009),  the  European  Commission  notes  that 
government investment yields a somewhat larger GDP multiplier than purchases of goods and 
services. An increase in government transfers has a smaller multiplier, as it goes along with 
negative  labour  supply incentives.  According European Commission's  findings,  temporary 
reductions in value added and labour taxes show smaller multipliers. Tighter credit constraints 
tend to increase the multiplier of these measures. A temporary reduction in consumption taxes 
is more effective than a reduction in labour taxes; it is attractive from a credibility point of 
view, since the private sector is likely to believe in a reversal of a temporary tax cut more than 
into a reversing of a temporary spending increase. Permanent reductions in VAT or labour 
taxes  could  yield  short-run  effects  exceeding  those  of  a  permanent  expenditure  increase, 
because they reduce distortions imposed by the tax system [European Commission (2009)].
Fiscal Policy during the current financial and economic crisis
Economic growth is one of the main aims of macroeconomists and the government, as it 
allows a movement  towards a better  standard of living for the population.  A recession is 
negative growth of GDP causing a downswing in the economies' business cycle. This is a 
direct threat to the primary aims of a government and so is high on its agenda of policies, 
tackling it  being a necessity [article on http://www.buythemap.com].  If the economy is in 
recession  then  a  government's  priority  will  be  to  stimulate  growth,  by  creating  more 
employment and increasing aggregate demand. Keynesian economics suggests that adjusting 
government spending and tax rates are the best ways to stimulate aggregate demand. This can 
be used in times of recession or low economic activity as an essential tool in providing the 
framework for strong economic growth and working toward full employment. In theory, these 
deficits  would be  paid for  by an  expanded economy during the  boom that  would follow 
[article on http://en.wikipedia.org].  Keynes opponents aver that  taxes may be a necessary 
“evil”  to  finance  government  operations  and  public  services,  but  they  distort  incentives, 
reduce investment  and labour  supply and dampen growth.  As for short-term stabilisation, 
discretionary  fiscal  spending is  too  susceptible  to  political  interference.  Better  to  rely  on 
automatic stabilisers  that  are beyond the reach of politicians'  personal interests  and to use 
interest  rates  and the money supply to  influence prices  or unemployment  levels  [Dayton-
Johnson  (2008)].  Therefore,  in  a  deep  crisis,  automatic  stabilisers  may  need  to  be 
strengthened [European Commission (2009)].
In theory, fiscal policy is effective. However, there are practical problems that would 
affect policy making in a recession. We point out the most important ones:
 Higher government spending can lead to higher interest rates due to all the borrowing 
that is going on which would cause a discouragement in private sector investment. 
 When tax is lowered, although consumers have more money to spend, they will save 
more due to the fear of unemployment;  increasing the amount of jobs does not create this 
attitude, and so more is spent. 
 The scale  and logistics  can make it  inflexible  and hard to  implement,  as  a  lot  of 
government spending is contractual and cannot be simply stopped and started easily.  
Accordingly, the case for using discretionary fiscal policy to stabilize business cycles is 
further weakened by the fact that another tool, monetary policy, is far more agile than fiscal 
policy [Weil (2008)].  As an alternative, monetary policy controls the supply of money and 
inflation, and it can be manipulated day to day. However, as a recession puts the government 
in a difficult position, both fiscal and monetary policy has to struggle to combat the effects of 
a downturn in economic growth. Fiscal policy is only one way of controlling the economy, if 
it is used in the correct way and, along with monetary policy, it can be an effective way of 
keeping growth buoyant [article on http://www.buythemap.com]. 
In  the  current  financial  crisis,  governments  around  the  world  must  formulate  and 
implement policies for taxation and public spending. Due to their major impacts on economic 
growth, income distribution, and poverty, nowadays they tend to be at the centre of economic 
and political debates [The World Bank (2007)]. The same opinion is expressed by  Dayton-
Johnson (2008) who emphasize that one of the unexpected by-products of the current global 
financial  crisis  is  that  “it  has  placed  fiscal  policy back at  the centre  of the public  policy 
debate”. Fiscal systems can provide the resources needed to carry out pro-growth investments 
and structural transformations, which in developing and emerging economies are so essential 
for long-term growth. Moreover, taxes and public spending can directly attack poverty and 
inequality, twin problems that continue to beset the region [Dayton-Johnson (2008)]. Terrones 
et  al  (2009)  also emphasize  that,  during recessions  associated  with financial  crises,  fiscal 
policy tends to have a more significant impact, being more effective when economic agents 
face tighter liquidity constraints.
As a response to the financial crisis, monetary policy has been radically eased, in terms 
of significant interest rate reductions [Andersen (2009)]. Olivier Blanchard, IMF Economic 
Counselor,  and  Carlo  Cottarelli,  Director  of  the  Fiscal  Affairs  Department  within  IMF 
[interviewed by Andersen (2008)] expressed the opinion that in the current financial context, 
the room for further monetary easing is shrinking, as in some countries policy interest rates 
are approaching zero. The same opinion has Andersen (2009), according to whom interest 
rates  have  been  reduced  to  low  levels,  implying  that  the  room  for  further  interest  rate 
reductions is small. Accordingly, it is a widespread perception that monetary policy cannot 
deliver sufficient stabilization in the present situation [Andersen (2009)], an opinion that is 
constantly brought forth since the collapse of Lehman Brothers [Belke (2009)].
Corsetti and Muller (2008) underline the necessity of the financing mix (taxes vs. future 
spending cuts), as well as coordinated cross-border fiscal expansionary policy. The opinion of 
a  common  and  coordinated  fiscal  policy  implementation  is  not  commonly  shared.  For 
example,  Belke (2009) suggests that it  might be better to have independent national fiscal 
policies  that  are  not  coordinated  or  not  correlated  under  Economic  and  Monetary  Union 
(EMU), based on several arguments: (i) fiscal policy can be a source of shocks in the context 
of the current crisis; (ii) policy makers do not have full control over the outcome, therefore 
the  effect  of  a  certain  measure  is  quite  different  from what  is  anticipated;  and  (iii)  the 
economic forecasts underlying fiscal policy might turn out to be wrong. 
Many researchers have the opinion that the global financial crisis is now turning into a 
worldwide economic crisis [Andersen (2009)]. This opinion is argued by the continuously 
revised downwards of business cycle forecasts. Negative growth rates are expected for many 
OECD countries for 2009. More specifically, overall deficits are projected to increase by 5.5 
percentage points of GDP in 2009 and 2010, with respect to both 2007 pre-crisis levels and 
excluding losses from financial sector support. In advanced G20 economies, fiscal deficits in 
2009-2010 are now estimated to be larger, in some cases reflecting weaker growth prospects 
in 2009 before a stronger recovery in 2010. By contrast, changes in fiscal balances are now 
expected to be smaller in other G20 countries, particularly those where commodity revenues 
are important, according to Horton et al (2009). Growth rates are expected to recover only 
sluggishly,  and,  consequently,  unemployment  rates  are  soaring  in  all  OECD  countries 
[Andersen (2009)]. 
In the Spring Forecast for 2009 issued by European Commission, several factors are 
mentioned  for  the  sharp  increase  in  the  projected  general  government  deficits:  (i)  the 
economic  downturn  is  bringing  about  declining  tax  revenue  and  rising  social  security 
expenditure, notably unemployment benefits; (ii) exceptional revenue windfalls witnessed in 
the recent boom period are continuing to reverse, which is reflected in a relatively strong 
erosion  of  some tax  bases;  and (iii)  in  line  with the  Commission's  European Economic 
Recovery Plan (see Box 2) many Member States have adopted significant discretionary fiscal 
stimulus packages to promote investment and sustain demand in general. 
According  to  the  EERP,  actions  should  aim  protecting  employment  and  promoting 
entrepreneurship and they have to be done in the four priority areas of the Lisbon Strategy: 
people, business, infrastructure and energy, research and innovation. 
a) People: the top priority must be to protect Europe's citizens from the worst effects  
of the current crisis. 
1. Launch a major European initiative on employment support by (i) rapidly reinforcing 
activation schemes, and (ii) improving the monitoring and matching of skills development 
and upgrading with existing and anticipated job vacancies, in close cooperation with social 
partners, public employment services and universities;
2.  Create demand for labour through (i) reducing employers' social charges on lower 
incomes to promote the employability of lower skilled workers, and (ii) adopting the proposed 
directive to make permanent reduced VAT rates for labour-intensive services. 
b)  Business:  sufficient  and  affordable  access  to  finance  as  a  pre-condition  for  
investment, growth and job creation by the private sector. In order to reduce administrative 
burdens on business, promote their cash flow and help more people to become entrepreneurs, 
the Member States should: 
 Ensure that starting-up a business anywhere in the EU can be done within three days 
at zero costs and that formalities for the hiring of the first employee can be fulfilled via a 
single access point; 
 Remove the requirement on micro-enterprises to prepare annual accounts and limit the 
capital requirements of the European private company to one euro; 
 Ensure  that  public  authorities  pay  invoices,  including  to  SMEs,  for  supplies  and 
services within one month to ease liquidity constraints and accept e-invoicing as equivalent to 
paper invoicing; 
 Reduce by up to 75% the fees for patent applications and maintenance and halve the 
costs for an EU trademark. 
Box 2. European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP)
The European Commission  presented  at  the end of  November  2008,  the  European 
Economic Recovery Plan, proposing a coordinated stimulus package to be implemented by 
the Member States taking into account their particular conditions. EERP has one fundamental 
principle, which is solidarity and social justice - in times of hardship, action must be geared  
to help those most in need. In addition, the Plan has two key pillars:
· A major injection of purchasing power into the economy, to boost demand and 
stimulate confidence: Member States and the EU agreed to an immediate budgetary impulse 
amounting to € 200 billion (1.5% of GDP), to boost demand in full respect of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) (see Box 3).
· A direct short-term action to reinforce Europe's competitiveness in the long term, 
aiming  the  area  of  “smart”  investments  (e.g.  energy  efficiency,  clean  technologies, 
infrastructure) [Commission of the European Communities (2008)]
Box 3. Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
The Stability and Growth Pact pertains to the third stage of EMU, which began on 1 
January 1999, in order to ensure that the Member States maintain budgetary discipline after 
the single currency has been introduced. SGP is a rule-based framework for the coordination 
of national  fiscal  policies,  established to safeguard sound public  finances.  It  consists of a 
preventive  and a  dissuasive arm.  Regarding  the  preventive  arm,  Member  States  have  to 
submit annual stability programmes, showing how they intend to achieve or safeguard sound 
fiscal positions in the medium term, taking into account the impending budgetary impact of 
population  aging.  The  dissuasive  part governs  the  excessive  deficit  procedure  that  is 
triggered by the deficit breaching the 3% of GDP threshold of the Treaty  of Maastricht on 
European Union [http://ec.europa.eu].
Following the Commission's guidelines in the EERP, the fiscal stimulus should be well 
defined and be based on the following principles: (i) it should be timely, temporary, targeted 
and coordinated at the European level; (ii) it should mix revenue and expenditure instruments; 
(iii)  it  should  be  conducted  within  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact;  and  (iv)  it  should  be 
accompanied  by  structural  reforms  that  support  demand  and  promote  resilience. These 
principles are particularly relevant given that, at the current juncture, markets tend to react 
rapidly  to  concerns  related  to  public  finance  sustainability  with  an  increase  in  the  risk 
premium  on  public  debt  instruments,  even  in  the  euro  area  context  [Banco  de  Portugal 
(2009)]. The role of fiscal stimulus, explained by Blanchard [Andersen, Camilla (2008)] is to 
limit  the decline in  demand as well  as output.  If  no fiscal  stimulus  is  implemented,  then 
demand may continue to fall and “vicious cycles” may appear, like as deflation and liquidity 
traps, expectations becoming more and more pessimistic and, as a result, a deeper and deeper 
recession. 
Government support can take various forms, with different implications for gross and 
net debt. These are summarized below, according to Spilimbergo et al (2009).
Public spending on goods and services – theoretically has a direct demand effect than 
transfers or tax cuts. Practically, the appropriate increase in public spending is constrained by 
the need to avoid waste. First, governments should make sure that existing programs are not 
cut for lack of resources. Governments facing balanced budget rules may be forced to suspend 
various  spending  programs  (or  to  raise  revenue).  Second,  spending  programs  that  were 
delayed, interrupted or rejected for lack of funding or macroeconomic considerations, can be 
(re)started quickly. A temporary increase in public sector employment associated with some 
of new programs and policies may be needed.
Fiscal stimulus aimed at consumers need to take into account the present exceptional 
conditions, specifically:  (i) decreases in wealth; (ii) tighter credit constraints, and (iii) high 
uncertainty.  The  degree  of  pass-through  to  consumers  is  uncertain,  its  unwinding  can 
contribute  to  a  further  downturn,  and  it  is  questionable  whether  decreases  of  just  a  few 
percentage points are salient enough to lead consumers to shift the timing of their purchases. 
Possibly larger, but more focused incentives, cash transfers for purchases of specific goods 
may attract more attention from consumers and have larger effects on demand.
Fiscal  stimulus  aimed at  firms has  as  a  main  objective  ensuring that  firms  do not 
reduce current operations for lack of financing. While this is primarily the job of monetary 
policy,  there  is  also  some  scope  for  governments  to  support  firms  that  could  survive 
restructuring, but find it difficult to receive the necessary financing from dysfunctional credit 
markets. 
Considering the recommendations of European Commission, it is necessary to answer 
two important questions: “What is the appropriate fiscal policy in the short term and what 
does this imply for the fiscal outlook?” and “What are the key elements of a fiscal strategy to 
ensure fiscal solvency?” [Cottarelli (2009)]. Answering the first question, Spilimbergo et al 
(2008)  highlight  that,  under  the circumstances  that  the current  crisis  will  last  at  least  for 
several more quarters, the fiscal stimulus can rely more on spending measures, as they may 
have  advantages  over  tax  cuts  or  increases  in  transfers,  which  operate  by  raising  the 
purchasing  power  of  households  and  firms  in  the  economy,  given  the  highly  uncertain 
response of the latter to an increase of their income in current circumstances. 
For ensuring fiscal solvency,  two priorities have to be considered to ensure that short-
term crisis alleviation is aligned with long-run development: (i) strengthening the social safety 
in order to help the most vulnerable and those most affected by the crisis to cope; and (ii) 
spending  increases  should  concentrate  in  areas  such  as  infrastructure  that  are  likely  to 
contribute  to  growth in  the  long term [Kraay and Servén (2008)].  In addition,  experience 
shows that  lower  direct  fiscal  costs  and  higher  recovery  rates  were  achieved  in  the  past 
(taking into account the severity of the crisis) when the banking crisis resolution strategy was 
(i) implemented swiftly, and transparent and received broad political support; (ii) backed by 
strong public institutions and legal frameworks; (iii)  consistent in terms of fair and uniform 
treatment  of  market  participants;  and  (iv)  was  part  of  a  clear  exit  strategy,  including 
restructuring of the banking sector [Schaechter (2009)].
Factors that matters in strengthening the reaction to fiscal stimulus 
Barrell et al (2009) identify two factors, which may matter for the transmission of fiscal 
policy impulses:
 Openness  of a country,  measured by import  volumes as a share of GDP, plays an 
important role in evaluation of the effectiveness of fiscal policy. When a government pursues 
an expansionary fiscal policy, a one-to-one effect on output cannot be expected, as a part of 
the aggregate demand's growth will go to imports.  The larger is the share of imports in a 
country's  GDP the bigger is the leakage to the imports  and the less effective is the fiscal 
package. 
 Liquidity  constraints approximated  by  the  relationship  between  changes  in 
consumption and changes in real disposable incomes, evaluate the strength of the impact of 
fiscal policy on domestic demand. Liquidity or borrowing constrained consumers spend more 
of increase in their current incomes than those who are able to make optimal borrowing and 
spending plans over time. The greater the share of liquidity constrained agents the larger the 
effects of fiscal shocks.
When taking into account the size of the economies of Member States, the distribution 
of fiscal stimulus efforts is broadly in line with the distribution of their needs and with the 
distribution of their ability to implement fiscal stimulus, without running into severe problems 
with regard of their balance of payments or fiscal position. This conclusion, drawn by the 
European Commission (2009), is based on the assumption that the fiscal stimulus packages 
are indeed temporary and will be fully reversed at the appropriate time when the economy 
recovers. 
To  maximise  its  impact,  the  budgetary  stimulus  should  take  account  the  starting 
positions of each Member State. “Those that took advantage of the good times to achieve 
more sustainable public finance positions and improve their competitive positions have more 
room for manoeuvre now”, according to EERP.  In countries with high pre-crisis ratios of 
public  sector  debt  to  GDP,  lack  of  fiscal  space (see  Box  4)  not  only  constraints  the 
government's  ability  to  implement  countercyclical  policies,  but  also  undermines  the 
effectiveness of fiscal stimulus and the quality of fiscal performance [Baldacci et al (2009)]. 
In countries with high debt or lower per capita income, crises lasted almost one year longer. 
Schaechter (2009) appreciates that during the strong economic pre-crisis times EU Member 
States “did not sufficiently strengthen their state of public finances,  often in contradiction 
with their medium-term plans”. 
Box 4. Fiscal space
Fiscal space is the room in a government's budget that allows it to provide resources  
for a desired purpose without jeopardizing the sustainability of its financial position or the  
stability  of the economy.  The composite indicator,  developed in European Commission, is 
created  including:  (i)  the  general  government  gross  debt-to-GDP  ratio,  (ii)  potential 
government contingent liabilities to the financial sector, (iii) estimates of foreseeable revenue 
shortfalls  in  the medium run,  (iv) the current  account  balance  as an indicator  of external 
imbalances, and (v) the share of nondiscretionary expenses as a proxy for the vulnerability of 
public expenses to meet short-run obligations [Schaechter (2009)]. The fiscal space is very 
different across Member States [European Commission (2009)].
Actions to alleviate the recession are involving fiscal costs no matter they are based on 
automatic stabilizers or discretionary fiscal stimulus. According to IMF (2009), some of these 
impacts will be short-lived and others will be longer lasting or even permanent. As things 
stand  now,  the  fiscal  costs  of  the  financial  and  economic  crisis  are  expected  to  be 
considerable.  In  its  spring  2009  forecast,  the  European  Commission  projected  that 
government borrowing in the euro area would rise to 5.3% of GDP in 2009 and 6.5% in 2010. 
In the euro area, government debt ratio, which stood at 66% in 2007, is projected to rise to 
84% in 2010. Thirteen out of sixteen euro area governments are projected to breach the 3% of 
GDP deficit reference value of the revised SGP. Moreover, according to González-Páramo 
(2009), “all are at  risk of doing so next year”.  These figures reflect  the impact on public 
finances of the contraction in economic activity. They also reflect the costs of discretionary 
fiscal  stimulus  measures  adopted  in  many  countries.  It  is  worth  to  mention  the  IMF's 
conclusion that the automatic stabilizers' impact is increasing as the economic conditions are 
weakened [IMF (2009)].
Baldacci et al (2009) emphasize that the composition of fiscal expansions matters for 
crisis  length.  Stimulus  packages  that  rely  mostly  on  measures  to  support  government 
consumption are more effective in shortening the crisis duration than those based on public 
investment. 10% increase in the share of public consumption in the budget, reduces the crisis 
length by three to four months. Many countries have announced fiscal stimulus plans. We 
summarize them, according to the IMF's Companion Paper (2009):
 Regarding the composition of fiscal stimulus package: (i) Expenditure measures: 
Almost  2/3  of  the  fiscal  stimulus  has  been  represented  by  expenditure  measures  with 
particular  emphasis  on  increased  spending  for  infrastructure.  Fifteen  of  the  G20  have 
announced plans to increase spending on infrastructure, largely on transportation networks 
(Canada,  France, Germany,  and Korea, among others), either in the form of direct central 
government spending, or through capital transfers to local authorities. According to Horton et 
al (2009),  emerging G20 countries have announced somewhat larger stimulus packages for 
2009, on average, than advanced G20 countries. This reflects smaller automatic stabilizers 
and consequently greater need, as well as substantial  fiscal space in key emerging market 
countries.  China, Russia,  Saudi Arabia, and South Africa have introduced large packages. 
Emerging  market  discretionary measures  are  also more  heavily  weighted to  infrastructure 
investment and less focused on income tax cuts (Figure 2). (ii) Revenue measures: Nine G20 
countries  have  announced sizable  cuts  in  personal  income taxes  (Brazil,  Canada,  France, 
Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Spain, the UK, and the US); while in six, indirect tax cuts have 
been announced. Cuts in the corporate income tax (CIT) have also been frequent but not as 
large;  these  include  outright  reduction  in  the  CIT  rate  (Canada,  Korea,  and  Russia), 
investment  incentives  (France  and  Korea),  or  more  favourable  depreciation  schedules 
(Germany, Russia, and the US).
Figure 2. Group of 20 (G20) economies: Fiscal stimulus by category in 2009
Source: Horton et  al.  2009. “The State of  Public Finances: A Cross-Country Fiscal  
Monitor”, IMF Staff Position Note SPN/09/21, pp. 5
 Regarding the aim of  fiscal  stimulus package:  Many countries  have announced 
plans  to  protect  vulnerable  groups,  including  by  strengthening  unemployment  benefits 
(Russia,  the  UK,  and the  US),  cash  transfers  to  the  poor  (Korea)  or  support  to  children 
(Australia,  Germany)  or  pensioners  (Australia,  Canada).  A  few  G20  countries  are  also 
stepping up support for small and medium enterprises (e.g., Korea) and strategic or vulnerable 
sectors,  such  as  construction  (in  Germany,  for  energy efficient  buildings  and repairs  and 
renovations),  defence and agriculture (Russia).  Finally,  a few countries are using stimulus 
measures to address longer-term policy challenges, such as improving the quality of health 
and education (Australia and China) or introducing incentives for environmentally-friendly 
technologies  (China,  Germany,  and  the  UK).  Revenue  measures  have  targeted  primarily 
households, through cuts in personal income and indirect taxes. 
Reviewing the supportive fiscal policies, IMF shows that the fiscal expansion is greater 
in advanced economies, reflecting the larger size of their governments and the greater role of 
automatic stabilizers such as income taxes and transfers (welfare payments, unemployment 
benefits) [IMF WEO (2009)]. For the G20 economies, crisis-related discretionary measures 
are estimated at about 2% of GDP for 2009 and 1.5% of GDP for 2010, both relative to 2007 
baselines. The categories of stimulus that were implemented most rapidly - tax breaks and 
transfer payments - are those that typically have lower effects on activity. Stimulus measures 
that  have higher multipliers  will  likely be implemented at  an accelerated pace during the 
second half of 2009, reflecting the lags inherent in new and expanded government spending 
programs, particularly in infrastructure. Estimates for 2010 reflect the phased implementation 
of stimulus spending initiated during 2009 and a carryover of tax provisions as well as the 
continued operation of automatic stabilizers.
Fiscal policy in Romania during the current crisis
According  to  the  European  Commission's  Spring  Forecast  2009,  in  the  first  three 
quarters of 2008, domestic demand for both consumption and investment boomed, fuelled by 
strong wage increases and a rapid expansion of credit. However, it proved that the ones less 
optimistic  concerning the impact  of the financial  turmoil  in the US and advanced Europe 
were, unfortunately, right. The effects of the turmoil have arrived in Romania with a lag, and 
the real and financial consequences are such that Romania faces a very sharp and disruptive 
economic slowdown. The largely foreign financed domestic demand boom and overheating 
pressures came to a sudden end at the beginning of the fourth quarter of 2008, following the 
significant  tightening  of  international  capital  inflows,  increased  investor  risk  aversion  to 
home-grown vulnerabilities  and decelerating  disposable  income.  Hence,  domestic  demand 
contracted  by  almost  2% y-o-y  (year-over-year)  in  the  fourth  quarter,  compared  with  an 
average increase of 14½% y-o-y in the first three quarters  [European Commission, Spring 
Forecast (2009)]. 
In 2008, the budget deficit surpassed the maximum threshold of 3% of the GDP set by 
the Stability and Growth Pact, being of 5.4% of GDP (ESA methodology). This was mainly 
due to substantially higher-than-planned current spending, notably in public wages and social 
transfers. In addition, overly optimistic revenue projections did not materialise and a sudden 
drop  in  revenue  collection  in  the  last  two  months  of  the  year  owing  to  the  economic 
slowdown added to the worse-than-expected outcome. 
These lead us to the conclusion that managing an economic boom has proved difficult: 
macroeconomic imbalances have widened - due to a persistent excess of consumption and 
investment over disposable income - and relatively high inflation has came up. Fiscal policy 
has contributed to the imbalances by more than spending revenues from higher growth (which 
led to larger  fiscal  deficits). Unfortunately,  Romania has missed the opportunity to create 
buffers under the continued-boom scenario as a protection against a possible sharp slowdown 
[Fernández-Ansola and Jaeger (2008)]. In our opinion, higher revenues from the continued 
economic boom should have been saved to create room for a fiscal expansion in case that 
inflows and the economy slow down significantly. A sharp-slowdown scenario has put strong 
pressure on the fiscal position, in the context that this was already weakened by inconsistency, 
due to a large number of taxes and their frequent changes, resulting in an increased fiscal 
pressure on business environment. 
The 2009 budget adopted in February 2009, contained several measures to lower the 
deficit,  including  a  recruitment  freeze  and the reduction  of  various  bonuses  in  the public 
sector, cuts in expenditure for goods and services and subsidies, limiting pension increases to 
inflation, a 3.3 percentage points rise in the pension contribution rate and a bringing forward 
of the schedule to increase excise taxes. On the revenue side, measures aimed at eliminating 
certain  tax deductions  and allowances  (in particular  on company cars and depreciation of 
revaluated assets). On the other hand, the government planed a substantial increase in public 
investment  in  2009  compared  with  2008.  These  measures  were  reflected  in  a  budget 
rectification  approved  by  the  government  in  April  2009  [European  Commission,  Spring 
Forecast (2009)]. 
The  Business  Monitor  International's  regional  report  on  political  risk  and 
macroeconomic prospects, issued in October 2009, argues that the data for Romania showed 
the economic downturn deepening during the second quarter 2009. According to the National 
Statistical Institute (NSI), the Romanian economy shrank by 8.8% y-o-y during the second 
quarter  2009,  surpassing  the  6.2%  decline  of  the  previous  quarter,  which  indicates  that 
economic  conditions  in  Romania  have  deteriorated  comparing  to  the  first  quarter.  This 
translates into a poor outlook for tax collection as corporate and household earnings continued 
to suffer. This is especially pertinent given that unemployment is typically a lagging indicator 
of the business cycle, with VAT receipts and income tax collection likely to deteriorate even 
when the economy embarks on recovery. In addition, any expenditure cuts proved unpopular 
among the electorate, making it increasingly difficult for the government to satisfy the IMF's 
loan conditions.
Though the IMF has raised Romania's budget deficit target in 2009 to 7.3% of GDP 
(from a previous  4.6%),  the  government  is  still  struggling  to  stabilise  the fiscal  account. 
Finance  Minister  Gheorghe Pogea announced in  August that  the government  would slash 
RON5.5bn  from  public  expenditures  in  2009.  Initiatives  include  sending  public  sector 
workers  on  unpaid  holiday  for  10  days  (contrary  to  the  European  Commission's 
recommendations),  eliminating  overtime pay,  as  well  as  reducing  spending on goods and 
services. While tightening fiscal policy has sustained foreign investor risk sentiment, the risks 
to political stability has raised as unemployment increased and real incomes fall alongside the 
reduction  in  public  sector  pay.  There  is  still  likely  that  the  required  deficit  target  to  be 
exceeded.  The  Business  Monitor  International's  regional  report  issued  in  November  2009 
forecasts a shortfall equivalent to 8.0% of GDP in 2009. The planned reduction in public 
expenditures is likely to prove insufficient to contain the gaping fiscal shortfall,  given the 
extent to which Romania's economic downturn is unfolding. 
Under these circumstances, according to the CESifo World Economic Survey published 
in August 2009, the assessment of the volume and structure of Romanian policy measures to 
fight financial and economic crisis was 1.3 (WES scale: 9 – fully sufficient; 5 – more or less 
sufficient; 1 – not sufficient) [Stangl and Nerb (2009)].
Regarding the fiscal measures, our opinion is that they put more pressure on people and 
business, contrary to the recommendation of European Commission to “protect employment  
and promote entrepreneurship”. Few examples are presented below:
o introducing  the flat-rate tax, which, instead of improving the tax collection, led to 
self-liquidation of small firms, increased unemployment, and reduced private initiative;
o large delays on VAT refund on behalf of public authorities, for exporting companies, 
which result in lake of liquidity;
o maintaining the  requirement  to  prepare  the  half-year  financial  statements  for  all 
companies; moreover, in some counties, fiscal authorities imposed that these statements to be 
audited by an accounting expert (which is not a legal-based requirement); this result in an 
increased cash burden for the SMEs;
o increasing the social charges, referring to the contribution to social security, which is 
higher with 1% for employees and 2.3% for companies;
o sending public sector workers on unpaid holiday for 10 days, which is completely 
against  the  European  Commission's  recommendation,  contained  in  the  EERP: “the  top 
priority must be to protect Europe's citizens from the worst effects of the financial crisis”. 
Therefore, in the current economic context, Romania's first priority should be to tackle 
macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances that pose risks to the sustainability of its medium to 
long-term growth path. In order to increase external competitiveness and to lower the current 
account deficit  and inflation,  Romania has to implement a medium-term fiscal  framework 
[Ernst & Young (2009)], in order to ensure fiscal sustainability. It is also necessary to revise 
the  composition  of  expenditure  to  increase  the  share  of  growth-enhancing  spending  by 
reducing and redirecting state aid to horizontal objectives and to keep wage developments in 
line  with  productivity  growth.  In  the  context  of  a  coherent  better  regulation  policy,  the 
implementation of measures to substantially reduce administrative procedures and delays in 
obtaining  authorizations  has  to  be  done  urgently,  in  order  to  improve  the  business 
environment  and  reduce  sources  for  corruption.  These  will  help  ensure  the  European 
Economic  Recovery  Plan  is  implemented  in  a  way  that  is  compliant  to  long  term 
sustainability as well as responds to the economic crisis. 
Conclusion
Crises can have long-term negative effects, damaging human and physical capital with 
negative implications for productivity and potential output growth. Therefore, early recovery 
from a crisis is important, to minimize output losses in the short term and enhance medium-
term growth prospects. We subscribe the opinion that this calls for timely, targeted and well-
designed fiscal responses during downturns. 
According to our findings, the impact of fiscal policy on demand depends on the size of 
fiscal  multipliers,  the  credibility  of  the  sustainability  of  fiscal  stimulus,  the  uncertainty 
surrounding the current and future economic environment, and the intensity and effectiveness 
of  international  cooperation.  Our conclusion is  that  fiscal  responses may not  be effective 
when initial fiscal conditions are poor and fiscal space is limited. High public debt levels and 
past  macroeconomic  instability  limit  the  scope  for  countercyclical  deficit  expansions  and 
hamper the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus measures as markets perceive the higher future 
fiscal risks entailed by larger deficits [Baldacci et al (2009)].
In Romania, the policy measures to fight financial and economic crisis ware assessed as 
“not  sufficient”.  We  argue  that  fiscal  measures  taken  so  far  are  ineffective,  resulting  in 
increased  tax  burden for  business  and people,  increased  liquidity  constraints,  and  lack of 
private initiative. Moreover, these measures are not compliant with the recommendations of 
European  Commission  and  the  EERP  provisions.  Our  conclusion  is  that,  on  short-term, 
Romania  should  implement  a  consistent  fiscal  stimulus  package,  in  order  to  protect 
employment  and promote  entrepreneurship.  On  medium-term,  the  fiscal  policy  objectives 
should  be  the  implementation  of  a  fiscal  framework  and  an  adequate  taxation  structure, 
aiming the tax collection  improvement  and preventing the tax evasion.  These will  reduce 
macroeconomic imbalances and ensure fiscal sustainability.   
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